Monday, December 19, 2005
What happens if God is a giant chicken?
Eternal consequences, that's what! And what would those be? Well, obviously, god is going to create a deadly bird flu to wipe us all out and repopulate the world in his image. Then we'll all be reincarnated as Big Bird clones and we'll all live together in a wonderful puppet world where everyone is fuzzy and corporate sponsorships are brought to you by the number 4.
Uh, something like that, yeah. But let's cut to the chase. There's been a LOT of hype about bird flu lately, and while some of it has been accurate, some of it has been dead wrong as well. In fact, I think that talking about it, in and of itself, is both accurate and inaccurate in some way. What the hell am I trying to say, you ask? Well let me explain.
The current flu strain that they are talking about- H5N1, is a virus that exists mainly in birds. It has been shown to jump to humans in a few instances, and in those instances, the mortality rate has been about 50%. That's a nice big number, and while not as high as say, rabies, or Ebola, there IS reason to fear this more than those other numbers. Why? Because flu is known to spread quickly among human populations, being transmissible through the air (unlike rabies) and having a longer incubation period than Ebola (allowing more time to spread through unknowing carriers).
So there's some bad news and some truth to that. But the problem is, that 50% number is basically meaningless for a few reasons. First, it's only 50% of the people with suspected cases of this flu- there may well be hundreds or thousands of poultry workers who have contracted a mild version of H5N1, chalked it up to the regular flu, and never having it documented by the health officials. Secondly, in an actual epidemic, a virus can't sustain a mortality rate of 50%. It would be a bad phenotypical trait for a virus to kill 50% of its hosts. It's one reason why Ebola doesn't reach epidemic numbers, and it's the reason why in any real flu epidemic, the mortality rate is much, much lower, like around 2.5% for the 1918 flu epidemic. The thing is, some people think of these viruses as a sentient being- like they're TRYING to kill us (which would probably only be true if god indeed is a giant chicken) and that if they had it their way, the mortality rate would be 100%. Think of it, instead, as more of a mathematical problem- the viruses are simply multiplying as best they can, and the best way to multiply is usually keeping your host alive longer to make more viruses. In fact, the ideal scenario for a virus would probably be to become incredibly transmissible, cause the host to make a bajillion copies of itself, and yet not cause any symptoms or immune response. In fact, this is more akin to what HIV does (and sort of why it's so ridiculously hard to kill/cure)
Still, 2.5% is nothing to brag about. That's still a significant portion of the population, and we probably don't want that to happen. But the problem is, what can we really do about it? Mainly, the asian countries most at risk have been resorting to mass killings of birds when there is a suspected case of the flu in one of them. Is this really helpful? Well, in a small way, yes, it does prevent transmission of that one actual population of virus. But it's not going to work forever, and it seems to me to be a move of desperation more than anything else. Because it's not a solution- it's a stopgap. Are we really going to kill every bird if we suspect it might be harboring a virus? Because every living thing on the planet is a potential virus factory. Some better than others, but the fact still remains that livestock themselves are risk factors and that some degree of disease is reality in a world where we still live with them.
Anyway, there's no guarantee that the next big pandemic is going to come from H5N1. It could come from a SARS-alike, or perhaps an HIV variant. Or maybe just a different strain of flu. Admittedly, it's the biggest threat on the horizon. Which is why you'll see lots of research doctors and policy wonks quoting off things like "this is the biggest threat we'll see in our lifetimes" and "we should be focusing on this rather than terrorism". Ok, maybe this last one is true. But really, the problem is that we can't predict mutations, and we can't predict what the virus' pathology would be like if/when it becomes transmissible from human to human. Is there a real chance of it happening? Yes, but I'd say the odds are still against it. Is there reason to be afraid? Almost certainly not.
So basically, in closing, what I want to say is- this is mostly hype by the media trying to spread fear into our hearts. That being said, we very likely will face some sort of pandemic in our lifetimes, and there probably won't be anything we could have done to stop it (maybe if we killed off every single bird on the planet?) And we're all going to die. But there's no reason to be afraid!
Uh, something like that, yeah. But let's cut to the chase. There's been a LOT of hype about bird flu lately, and while some of it has been accurate, some of it has been dead wrong as well. In fact, I think that talking about it, in and of itself, is both accurate and inaccurate in some way. What the hell am I trying to say, you ask? Well let me explain.
The current flu strain that they are talking about- H5N1, is a virus that exists mainly in birds. It has been shown to jump to humans in a few instances, and in those instances, the mortality rate has been about 50%. That's a nice big number, and while not as high as say, rabies, or Ebola, there IS reason to fear this more than those other numbers. Why? Because flu is known to spread quickly among human populations, being transmissible through the air (unlike rabies) and having a longer incubation period than Ebola (allowing more time to spread through unknowing carriers).
So there's some bad news and some truth to that. But the problem is, that 50% number is basically meaningless for a few reasons. First, it's only 50% of the people with suspected cases of this flu- there may well be hundreds or thousands of poultry workers who have contracted a mild version of H5N1, chalked it up to the regular flu, and never having it documented by the health officials. Secondly, in an actual epidemic, a virus can't sustain a mortality rate of 50%. It would be a bad phenotypical trait for a virus to kill 50% of its hosts. It's one reason why Ebola doesn't reach epidemic numbers, and it's the reason why in any real flu epidemic, the mortality rate is much, much lower, like around 2.5% for the 1918 flu epidemic. The thing is, some people think of these viruses as a sentient being- like they're TRYING to kill us (which would probably only be true if god indeed is a giant chicken) and that if they had it their way, the mortality rate would be 100%. Think of it, instead, as more of a mathematical problem- the viruses are simply multiplying as best they can, and the best way to multiply is usually keeping your host alive longer to make more viruses. In fact, the ideal scenario for a virus would probably be to become incredibly transmissible, cause the host to make a bajillion copies of itself, and yet not cause any symptoms or immune response. In fact, this is more akin to what HIV does (and sort of why it's so ridiculously hard to kill/cure)
Still, 2.5% is nothing to brag about. That's still a significant portion of the population, and we probably don't want that to happen. But the problem is, what can we really do about it? Mainly, the asian countries most at risk have been resorting to mass killings of birds when there is a suspected case of the flu in one of them. Is this really helpful? Well, in a small way, yes, it does prevent transmission of that one actual population of virus. But it's not going to work forever, and it seems to me to be a move of desperation more than anything else. Because it's not a solution- it's a stopgap. Are we really going to kill every bird if we suspect it might be harboring a virus? Because every living thing on the planet is a potential virus factory. Some better than others, but the fact still remains that livestock themselves are risk factors and that some degree of disease is reality in a world where we still live with them.
Anyway, there's no guarantee that the next big pandemic is going to come from H5N1. It could come from a SARS-alike, or perhaps an HIV variant. Or maybe just a different strain of flu. Admittedly, it's the biggest threat on the horizon. Which is why you'll see lots of research doctors and policy wonks quoting off things like "this is the biggest threat we'll see in our lifetimes" and "we should be focusing on this rather than terrorism". Ok, maybe this last one is true. But really, the problem is that we can't predict mutations, and we can't predict what the virus' pathology would be like if/when it becomes transmissible from human to human. Is there a real chance of it happening? Yes, but I'd say the odds are still against it. Is there reason to be afraid? Almost certainly not.
So basically, in closing, what I want to say is- this is mostly hype by the media trying to spread fear into our hearts. That being said, we very likely will face some sort of pandemic in our lifetimes, and there probably won't be anything we could have done to stop it (maybe if we killed off every single bird on the planet?) And we're all going to die. But there's no reason to be afraid!
# posted by Stuart @ 9:04 AM 
Comments:
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Great conclusion, Stu. The hyping of looming threats does very little when it comes to finding a solution. Luckily, competent scientists exist in both academia and the government that spend their lives researching such problems. With the randomness of mutation and the plethora of threats, we must support as many response mechanisms as possible.
1. Continue funding research by the Center for Disease Control, World Health Organization, and others. (This also means that political appointees should keep their stick fingers and black markers off of the scientific method)
2. Encourage domestic production of vaccines and treatments. Right now America supply of flu vaccines are exclusively made by foreign manufacturers. If a global epidemic occurs, it is a sure bet that those foreign governments would block exports in the interest of protecting their own. Congress, awash with pharmaceuticul largesse, has coddled big pharma and encouraged a gaping hole in our medical infrastructure.
3. Wash your hands.
Andrew
1. Continue funding research by the Center for Disease Control, World Health Organization, and others. (This also means that political appointees should keep their stick fingers and black markers off of the scientific method)
2. Encourage domestic production of vaccines and treatments. Right now America supply of flu vaccines are exclusively made by foreign manufacturers. If a global epidemic occurs, it is a sure bet that those foreign governments would block exports in the interest of protecting their own. Congress, awash with pharmaceuticul largesse, has coddled big pharma and encouraged a gaping hole in our medical infrastructure.
3. Wash your hands.
Andrew
# posted by 
: 11:39 AM
: 11:39 AM
Once again I failed to come up with any real solutions, but yours are good. Washing your hands is pretty important. Eating right is pretty important, exercising. Basically a healthy immune system is your best bet. As the writers of this blog are relatively healthy young males, you might think that we'd be the least likely to die in a pandemic. However, in the 1918 flu pandemic, not only did the young and elderly die at increased rates, there was a strange spike in the young adult male population- leading to the so-called W-shaped mortality curve instead of the usual U shaped curve. Something else to be afraid of, I guess.
Also, don't chew off the beaks of living chickens for the purposes of cockfighting. That's a cardinal rule of mine.
Keep in mind that in a real pandemic, zombies always try to bite you to infect you. And the only way to kill a zombie is with a clean shot to the head. To that end, ammunition is always a good purchase and is also very applicable in the event of home invasions, nuclear winters, and robotic infestations.
Lastly, stock up on crosses, holy water, and other religious paraphrenalia. remember, only jesus can save you from the superflu.
Also, don't chew off the beaks of living chickens for the purposes of cockfighting. That's a cardinal rule of mine.
Keep in mind that in a real pandemic, zombies always try to bite you to infect you. And the only way to kill a zombie is with a clean shot to the head. To that end, ammunition is always a good purchase and is also very applicable in the event of home invasions, nuclear winters, and robotic infestations.
Lastly, stock up on crosses, holy water, and other religious paraphrenalia. remember, only jesus can save you from the superflu.
While I generally agree with your comments that there is over-hyping of the problem, I think that there are a couple of worrying aspects to a new flu-pandemic (whether it is the H5N1 strain or not, it will happen at some point.) The first is that a lot has changed in the world since 1918, especially concerning how long it takes for a pandemic to spread around the world. I believe that in 1918, Australia and the United States were 2 of the last places to get the pandemic because of the relative difficulty in reaching these places, and these places were at least 6-9 months removed from what is the agreed start of the pandemic. Any new pandemic will spread much quicker now, posing a threat to almost the enitre world at the same time. This timeline is also key because it is estimated that any vaccine will take at about 6 months to be produced in large enough quantities to be effective in a large population. This 6 month clock starts once the pandemic starts, as this is when the scientists know exactly what strain to design the vaccine for.
This brings me to a part of your argument that I do not agree with. You state that "But really, the problem is that we can't predict mutations, and we can't predict what the virus' pathology would be like if/when it becomes transmissible from human to human". While the actual mutations are random, and occur randomly, scientists can still work towards being able to predict what a transmissible form in humans will look like. Any mutation will have one of the following effects on the virus:
-kills the virus/makes it non viable (inserts a stop codon, interupts a critical gene)
-happens in a part of the genome that does not code for a protein (no difference)
-does not change the amino acid sequence, so does not affect any phenotype
-affects phenotype, lowering the virus' transmissibility/virulence
-affects phenotype, raising the virus' transmissibility/virulence
Of all the above possibilites, many scientists do not have to worry about. If scientists are trying to precict what a virulent strain, with high transmissibility in humans looks like, many of the possible mutations can be identified and ignored as not possible because they fall into the first 2 categories. With an overall genome probably smaller than 10,000 bp, there are not an infinite number of possible mutations present that scientists have to look at to get an idea of what would have to happen to H5N1 to be transmissible in humans.
Another possiblity is that the H5N1 strain recombines (exchanges DNA) with another similar virus inside of a nonhuman host, and the new virus retains the virulence of the H5N1 matched with transmissibility from the other virus. This is a worrisome scenario, as the H5N1 virus has recently been found in pigs, which are known to be a host for many other flu-like viruses that humans can catch and exchange. However, scientists can get an idea of what this particular combination will look like by studying the other viruses. Overall, scientists will not have an exact picture of what a virulent/transmissible H5N1 strain will look like, but they should have enough of an idea that they can identify it soon after it emerges. That assumes that whatever country it emerges in does not suppress the news and try to keep it quiet.
So, while the H5N1 strain is not an imminent threat, I think that is does pose a serious risk, and the scientific community should not take it lightly. But it is not time to go out and wear masks and lab gloves at all times.
-Derek
This brings me to a part of your argument that I do not agree with. You state that "But really, the problem is that we can't predict mutations, and we can't predict what the virus' pathology would be like if/when it becomes transmissible from human to human". While the actual mutations are random, and occur randomly, scientists can still work towards being able to predict what a transmissible form in humans will look like. Any mutation will have one of the following effects on the virus:
-kills the virus/makes it non viable (inserts a stop codon, interupts a critical gene)
-happens in a part of the genome that does not code for a protein (no difference)
-does not change the amino acid sequence, so does not affect any phenotype
-affects phenotype, lowering the virus' transmissibility/virulence
-affects phenotype, raising the virus' transmissibility/virulence
Of all the above possibilites, many scientists do not have to worry about. If scientists are trying to precict what a virulent strain, with high transmissibility in humans looks like, many of the possible mutations can be identified and ignored as not possible because they fall into the first 2 categories. With an overall genome probably smaller than 10,000 bp, there are not an infinite number of possible mutations present that scientists have to look at to get an idea of what would have to happen to H5N1 to be transmissible in humans.
Another possiblity is that the H5N1 strain recombines (exchanges DNA) with another similar virus inside of a nonhuman host, and the new virus retains the virulence of the H5N1 matched with transmissibility from the other virus. This is a worrisome scenario, as the H5N1 virus has recently been found in pigs, which are known to be a host for many other flu-like viruses that humans can catch and exchange. However, scientists can get an idea of what this particular combination will look like by studying the other viruses. Overall, scientists will not have an exact picture of what a virulent/transmissible H5N1 strain will look like, but they should have enough of an idea that they can identify it soon after it emerges. That assumes that whatever country it emerges in does not suppress the news and try to keep it quiet.
So, while the H5N1 strain is not an imminent threat, I think that is does pose a serious risk, and the scientific community should not take it lightly. But it is not time to go out and wear masks and lab gloves at all times.
-Derek
# posted by : 11:20 AM
: 11:20 AM
I agree with everything you said. I didn't mean to imply that research won't be fruitful and that the virus could mutate into rabies at any point.
Obviously there are trends and tendencies, (it is just DNA and protein after all) and since we can sequence the entire genome of any virus quickly, there are a lot of things we can do to mitigate a pandemic.
It's also true that with air travel and a truly global world, this pandemic would be much harder to contain. But we also have paranoia, quarantine, and newer medical sterilization procedures on our side. I don't believe that in a matter of 6 hours after patient zero walks into an international airport we will all be sucking down viruses.
Give me a little credit though- I did say that this is "the biggest threat on the horizon", I did rank germs as number 2 in my doomsday blog, and I do indeed believe that there will be a pandemic. (actually i think global climate change is still a bigger threat) And I think that research is important, disaster preparedness is important, etc. But I feel like the media is just latching onto this as a way of fearmongering, because people are getting complacent since we haven't had a terrorist attack, the economy is doing well, and katrina is old news. Basically, they're going to cry wolf over and over again every time there is a poultry scare, or a SARS-like event. Eventually, they'll be right.
But that doesn't mean we have to be afraid of it. I mean, we could die from anything at any time. The ODDS are low, that's all.
That's not to say that we shouldn't take it seriously. Eventually, there will be another terrorist attack- another plane crash- another pandemic, and another hurricane. We should take these things seriously because prevention and mitigation are better than damage control and PR work after the fact. We should take a lot of things seriously that we don't, simply because we don't fear them.
Perhaps I don't have all the data about viral research, but I think the spirit of the post is still viable- there's no reason to think that this is an IMMINENT threat to our personal safety, so, like you said, there's no reason to be afraid and "wear masks and lab gloves".
P.S. Derek is in on this whole conspiracy, because the more people get scared about viruses, the more funding universities get.
Obviously there are trends and tendencies, (it is just DNA and protein after all) and since we can sequence the entire genome of any virus quickly, there are a lot of things we can do to mitigate a pandemic.
It's also true that with air travel and a truly global world, this pandemic would be much harder to contain. But we also have paranoia, quarantine, and newer medical sterilization procedures on our side. I don't believe that in a matter of 6 hours after patient zero walks into an international airport we will all be sucking down viruses.
Give me a little credit though- I did say that this is "the biggest threat on the horizon", I did rank germs as number 2 in my doomsday blog, and I do indeed believe that there will be a pandemic. (actually i think global climate change is still a bigger threat) And I think that research is important, disaster preparedness is important, etc. But I feel like the media is just latching onto this as a way of fearmongering, because people are getting complacent since we haven't had a terrorist attack, the economy is doing well, and katrina is old news. Basically, they're going to cry wolf over and over again every time there is a poultry scare, or a SARS-like event. Eventually, they'll be right.
But that doesn't mean we have to be afraid of it. I mean, we could die from anything at any time. The ODDS are low, that's all.
That's not to say that we shouldn't take it seriously. Eventually, there will be another terrorist attack- another plane crash- another pandemic, and another hurricane. We should take these things seriously because prevention and mitigation are better than damage control and PR work after the fact. We should take a lot of things seriously that we don't, simply because we don't fear them.
Perhaps I don't have all the data about viral research, but I think the spirit of the post is still viable- there's no reason to think that this is an IMMINENT threat to our personal safety, so, like you said, there's no reason to be afraid and "wear masks and lab gloves".
P.S. Derek is in on this whole conspiracy, because the more people get scared about viruses, the more funding universities get.
When do you think is an important time to get scared and recognize an imminent pandeminc? I do believe that on the one hand, the media does promote fear and such, but at the same time shouldn't we get scared BEFORE the problem arises? If we wait till afterwards it is too late.
Would it be cool if we had a pandemic chart like there is that terror meter that is red and yellow and shit?
Also, what is the difference between an epidemic and pandemic? I looked it up online and they were very similar definitions. Is pandemic like a new word that people like using? Or does it apply specifically to this situation?
-Smoov
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Would it be cool if we had a pandemic chart like there is that terror meter that is red and yellow and shit?
Also, what is the difference between an epidemic and pandemic? I looked it up online and they were very similar definitions. Is pandemic like a new word that people like using? Or does it apply specifically to this situation?
-Smoov
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